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ABSTRACT The!Usability!Implications!of!Long!Ballot!Content!for!Paper,!Electronic,!and!Mobile!Voting!Systems!by!Bryan!A.!Campbell!
In the 2008 United States presidential election over 131 million ballots were cast. 
A substantial fraction of those ballots, approximately 23 million (17.5%), were cast as 
absentee ballots either domestically or by overseas and military citizens (EAC, 2008). 
These numbers demonstrate that a demand exists in the United States for less centralized 
voting procedures. One potential solution, allowing voters to cast ballots on Internet-
enabled mobile devices, could potentially increase voter participation, reduce election 
administration costs, increase election flexibility, and provide the ability for voters to 
interact with familiar technology.  
Two experiments were conducted to examine the efficacy of a custom-designed 
mobile voting system as compared to more traditional voting technologies such as direct 
recording electronic and paper ballot voting systems. The results from experiment one 
suggest that displaying long ballot content as a single scrollable list may have distinct 
negative consequences on the effectiveness of electronic voting systems. Further, 
experiment one showed that candidates appearing below the fold, or not immediately 
visible without additional action from the voter are at a higher risk of being mistakenly 
voted against. The results from experiment two are largely consistent with experiment 
one in that they showed that a scrollable review screen led to more voting errors and that 
those candidates below the fold were at a distinct disadvantage.   
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the 2008 United States presidential election over 131 million ballots were cast. 
A substantial fraction of those ballots, approximately 23 million (17.5%), were cast as 
absentee ballots either domestically or by overseas and military citizens (EAC, 2008). 
These numbers demonstrate that a demand exists in the United States for less centralized 
voting procedures. As voters become increasingly mobile it is not unreasonable to expect 
that demand for mobile access to more traditionally location-specific services will 
increase. In the United States, the voting process is one service that has traditionally been 
very location specific; voters are generally required to travel to polling places to cast their 
votes. Currently, the only alternative for U.S. voters who are unwilling or unable to travel 
to a polling place is to cast an absentee ballot. 
 One potential solution is using Internet-enabled devices as voting platforms. 
Motived in part by recent advances in smartphones (cellular telephones enhanced with 
relatively large screens and full Internet browsing capabilities), technology is evolving to 
enable users to become increasingly mobile. As of 2012, one estimate put United States 
smartphone penetration at nearly 50% (Sharma, 2012), meaning that nearly half of all 
U.S. residents owned a smartphone. Allowing voters to cast ballots on these devices 
could potentially increase voter participation, reduce election administration costs, 
increase election flexibility, and provide the ability for voters to interact with familiar 
technology. 
 The research reported here is twofold and focuses primarily on the last point: 
providing the ability for voters to interact with familiar technology. A majority of the 
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U.S. electorate only casts a ballot once every four years during a national presidential 
election (EAC, 2008). In that regard, most U.S. voters never have the opportunity to 
become truly familiar with voting technology or election procedures. Further 
complicating the matter is the fact the U.S. does not have a federalized voting system and 
thus voting systems and election procedures vary greatly from state to state or county to 
county. Thus, expert voters are quite few and far between and even the most experienced 
voters may not be considered expert voters when crossing state lines. Mobile voting 
technologies (e.g., smartphones or tablet computers) may enhance voting system usability 
by allowing voters to cast ballots with familiar technology. Designing effective and 
usable ballots for mobile voting systems, however, will undoubtedly be more challenging 
as the screen real estate is at a premium. It is currently unclear how best to display ballot 
content that is too long to be displayed in its entirety on small-screen mobile devices. The 
research presented here focuses on how long ballot content interacts with or perhaps even 
influences the usability of mobile voting systems. 
VOTING USABILITY 
Recent advances in smartphone technologies have made these devices much 
easier to interact with. Smartphones now offer advanced functionality for improved 
efficiency and have opened up new ways for users to retrieve and use information 
(Matthews et al., 2009). Mobile content, optimized for small screen viewing and data 
entry, is now more commonplace across the Internet. While still not as efficient as the 
PC, this content has significantly enhanced usability for a number of tasks. For example, 
Internet navigation on optimized content yields significantly reduced network wait-time 
and increased efficiency compared to non-mobile sites (Tossell, Kortum, Shepard, 
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Rahmati & Zhong, 2010). Nevertheless, for a task as complex and important as voting to 
successfully take place on a smartphone, specific usability requirements, some of which 
may be unique to the medium, will have to be established. 
 The usability of any voting system, including mobile or Internet technologies, is 
critical to election integrity. The infamous Palm Beach County (PBC), FL, U.S. 
presidential election debacle in 2000 caused many U.S. election officials to adopt more 
technologically advanced voting systems as a means to help safeguard election integrity. 
Supporting this effort, in 2002 the United States Congress passed the Help America Vote 
Act (HAVA) with the goal of replacing legacy voting systems with newer voting 
technologies. The underlying problem with the 2000 PBC presidential election, however, 
was not that the voting technology was too antiquated. Rather, the ballot’s format (a.k.a. 
the “butterfly ballot”) led to a substantial decrease in usability for many voters. In 
particular, the awkward positioning of candidates and imprecise positioning of arrows, 
meant to be visual aids, led many voters to make a selection other than their intended one. 
Exacerbating this problem was the fact that punch card system itself made it very difficult 
for voters (especially older or visually impaired voters) to confirm the selections they had 
made.   
 While the PBC election is the most well-known example, there are many cases 
where usability issues are likely to have determined the outcome of an election (e.g., see 
Norden et al., 2008). Prior to 2002’s HAVA and the upswing in adoption of electronic 
voting systems, little usability research existed on efficacy of these systems or how they 
compared to legacy voting systems (Laskowski et al., 2004). As a result, many electronic 
voting systems may actually serve to reduce the effectiveness of the voting process.    
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 In 2007, Everett studied review screen anomalies (i.e., cases in which the review 
screen did not reflect the voter’s actual votes) on an electronic voting system, known as a 
direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system, and found that approximately two-thirds 
of voters did not notice up eight review screen anomalies in a 27-contest ballot. In a 
further replication and expansion of the review screen anomaly work, Campbell and 
Byrne (2009) showed that even with user interface improvements and explicit mention of 
review screen importance, approximately half of voters were still likely to miss up to 
eight review screen anomalies in a 27 contest ballot. In 2008, Greene showed that 
intentional undervotes (i.e., purposeful abstentions from voting) increase dramatically 
with a direct access navigation model as compared to a sequential access navigation 
model. Finally, comparing DRE voting machines to paper ballots and punch cards, in 
2008 Everett, et al. showed that voters were overwhelmingly more satisfied with the DRE 
experience despite the DRE showing little to no improvement in efficiency or 
effectiveness, and in some cases, showing worse performance.   
 These studies highlight the critical role that usability research will play if the U.S. 
is to have a successful transition towards mobile Internet voting capabilities. The last 
time our nation tried to upgrade its election technology, after the 2000 presidential 
election debacle, the transition did not go well. States and counties rushed to spend 
billions of dollars on computerized voting systems that turned out to be inadequate to 
solve their problems. By the 2006 presidential election, electronic voting was the most 
common form of voting in the U.S. (Brace, 2008). Unfortunately, the technology was not 
ready, and the human factors and computer science communities were not prepared to 
participate effectively in its implementation, nor in the related policy debates. As a 
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consequence, many jurisdictions have since abandoned their computerized voting 
systems in favor of optical scan voting systems (Brace, 2008). Therefore, if the trend 
towards Internet (and by extension smartphone) voting continues there exists a relatively 
small window of opportunity to learn as much as we can about how newer remote voting 
technologies can and should support voters in their goal of easily, and securely, 
submitting a remote ballot.  
INTERNET VOTING SECURITY 
The security of any mobile voting system will also be paramount to election 
integrity and voter trust. Gibson (2001) divides mobile voting security concerns into three 
general areas: authentication, privacy, and integrity. Authentication refers to the ability to 
correctly determine that the ballot being received is from the same person who sent the 
votes. Without proper authentication it would possible for a single person to cast multiple 
votes. Traditionally this task is carried out at the polling place where poll workers verify 
the identity of the person standing before them against pre-generated voter registration 
lists. Internet voting has the potential to complicate this process by disassociating 
physical means of voter authentication (e.g., state issued ID cards) from the place where 
the votes are collected. 
  Gibson (2001) describes privacy as the notion that is it unknown to anyone but the 
voter what his or her votes were. Privacy is extremely important to election integrity for 
two reasons. First, it helps prevent the purchasing of votes. Currently, once a voter enters 
the voting booth, they are the only one able to identify exactly whom they actually voted 
for. Second, for the same reason, privacy helps prevent voter coercion. Internet voting 
has the potential to complicate this process by requiring identifying information to be 
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transmitted alongside the ballot. It could be argued that voting via the Internet has the 
potential to break down the protections already in place against vote buying and voter 
coercion. Currently, however, the only protections in place to dissuade this type of 
behavior exist solely within polling places where polices and procedures to ensure 
privacy are explicitly maintained. While it may be true that Internet voting would remove 
these protections the same can be said about current absentee ballot procedures. Typically 
an absentee ballot is mailed to the voter who in turn fills it out and mails it back. As a 
result, there are currently no protections in U.S. elections against vote buying or voter 
coercion when voting an absentee ballot. Given the number of absentee ballots submitted 
in the 2008 presidential election it is unclear how or even if Internet voting would alter 
this dynamic. 
 According to Gibson (2001), integrity is the notion that the voter’s ballot has not 
been tampered with. This is likely the most salient component of election security. In 
order to ensure election integrity it is critical that voters’ intentions are accurately 
reflected in the final tallies. Internet voting complicates the requirement of vote integrity 
by introducing new vectors in which the integrity of a vote can be compromised. For 
example, the hardware used to vote over the Internet is not necessarily under the control 
of the election administration. Voters themselves may be using outdated, broken, 
modified or otherwise unsuitable equipment to vote with. 
 Further, Internet voting presents the opportunity for malicious forces to 
compromise vote integrity on a large scale. While it may not be necessarily difficult 
given current voting equipment policies and procedures for an attacker to manipulate 
election outcomes, the results of such manipulations are generally limited to the precinct 
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or postal level; it would be extremely difficult to perpetrate large scale attacks across an 
entire state or even multiple precincts. The individualistic nature of today’s polling places 
can be seen as an inherent protection against large-scale attacks. Though nothing in 
current vote-by-mail absentee voting processes necessarily protects against integrity 
compromises; they too enjoy a modicum of protection in that compromises are generally 
limited in scope. Internet voting, however, has the potential to make this issue widespread 
(Mohen & Glidden, 2001). In a centralized voting system such as that which would 
undoubtedly be necessary to enable Internet voting, an attacker needs only to 
compromise a single source (likely a computer) in order to manipulate ballots across any 
number of precincts or voters.  
 Thus, given the same the same security requirements as traditional voting 
methods while introducing a host of new security vulnerabilities, some researchers 
believe that voting via the Internet is an insurmountable challenge. In 2000 the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment 
(SERVE) allowed “84 citizens located in 21 states and 11 countries” to cast ballots in 
four different state-level jurisdictions (DOD, 2003). After reviewing SERVE, Jefferson, 
Rubin, Simons, and Wagner (2004) concluded that this particular initiative, and by 
extension Internet voting in general, “cannot be made secure for use in real elections for 
the foreseeable future.” While the authors describe many of the fundamental security 
vulnerabilities attributable to SERVE, and Internet voting, their primary concern was that 
the hardware used to cast those ballots was not in the control of election officials; thereby 
opening an array of potential security vulnerabilities. 
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 Voter controlled hardware, however, is not the only concern. As demonstrated by 
their attack on Washington D.C.’s pilot Internet voting project, called Digital Vote-by-
Mail (DVBM), even “small, seemingly minor engineering mistakes in practically any 
layer of the software stack can result in total system compromise” (Wolchok, Wustrow, 
Isabel, & Halderman, 2012). The DVBM system was designed to allow military and 
overseas voters to cast their ballots electronically and was slated to go live in the 
November 2010 election. Prior to its implementation, however, Washington D.C. 
initiated a public trial, using a mock election, of the DVBM that included a call for 
security experts to evaluate its defenses. Wolchok et al. (2012) were not only able to gain 
access to the system, changing votes and hiding their tracks along the way, but were also 
able to gain access to peripherally related systems connected to D.C.’s election 
administration systems (e.g., networked cameras that allowed the researcher to observe 
election administrators in real time). Like Jefferson et al. (2004), Wolchok et al. (2012) 
caution against Internet voting due to inherent security vulnerabilities. 
 Despite these security concerns, using the Internet as a voting platform is not a 
novel idea; it is already occurring. There is evidence that a trend toward Internet voting is 
already underway. Congress, through the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 1986 and the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment 
(MOVE) Act of 2009, has directed the U.S. military to enable some form of electronic 
remote voting for soldiers and overseas citizens as postal ballots are both slow and 
unreliable. The Federal Voting Assistance Program interprets these acts as requiring 
immediate development of Internet voting standards and pilot projects.  
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 Outside the U.S., in 2011, the Republic of Estonia became the first democracy to 
allow mobile phone voting in a national election (Alvarez, Hall & Trechsel, 2009). As a 
result, some form of Internet voting seems inevitable and it follows then that smartphones 
or other Internet-capable mobile technologies will likely play a role. Higher familiarity 
with mobile phones could also lead to increased voter satisfaction and opportunities to 
vote. Nevertheless, over the past 10 or so years, there has been a sizable amount of 
research on the challenges associated with designing for mobile phones. Much of this 
research has shown the difficulties involved with human-computer interfaces on 
previous-generation mobile phones. Specifically, these devices have noted usability 
problems with small-screen displays (e.g., Duchnicky & Kolers, 1983), data entry 
(Smordal & Gregory, 2005), slower network speeds (Kukulska-Hulme, 2007), and a lack 
of optimized mobile content. Other problems associated with the user experience include 
low battery life and wireless network reliability. What is lacking then, is research focused 
on the usability of voting systems designed for small-screen mobile devices. 
MOBILE VOTING RESEARCH 
 Towards this end, in 2011 Campbell, Tossell, Byrne, and Kortum gathered 
baseline usability data on the efficacy of a voting system designed for a smartphone. 
Utilizing sequential navigation, touch-based interaction, and scrolling content models the 
mobile voting system (MVS) they designed was implemented as a Javascript Internet 
application with ballot content optimized for display on a small-screen smartphone. The 
authors evaluated their MVS and two legacy voting systems, a DRE and a paper ballot, 
against three usability metrics: efficiency, effectiveness, and user satisfaction. These 
usability metrics were adopted from the International Organization for Standardization's 
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(ISO) general usability standard (ISO 9241-11, 1998) and were first applied to the 
context of voting by Laskowski et al. (2008). 
In Campbell et al. (2011), efficiency was operationalized as the time it takes a 
voter to complete their ballot. Effectiveness was defined as how many error per ballot the 
voting systems produced and subjective user satisfaction was expressed as how well-
liked the voting systems were measured via a usability assessment questionnaire. 
Irrespective of voter age or education, the authors reported that their MVS was nearly as 
efficient as the two legacy voting systems. User satisfaction ratings were also on par with 
the legacy voting systems, all of which where relatively high. They noted that the 
effectiveness of the MVS, however, was highly dependent on the whether or not the 
subject currently owned a smartphone. Voters who owned smartphones yielded error 
rates that were lower on the MVS than when they were voting on one of the legacy 
voting systems. Primarily this was a reduction in the number of accidental mis-touches by 
voters; a leading cause of voter error (Campbell & Byrne, 2009).  
 The authors suggest that this result reinforces the notion that enabling Internet 
voting, and by extension smartphone voting, carries the potential to increase voting 
effectiveness by allowing voters to vote using technology they are already familiar with. 
It is true that many U.S. voters only vote only once every two to four years and thus 
never get the opportunity to become completely comfortable with the technology. Thus, 
the situation has been made worse in the last decade by the relatively recent nationwide 
transition to DREs and subsequent transition back to paper ballots (Brace, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of this effect is difficult to determine, as it is unclear if the 
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increase in effectiveness would necessarily scale with more realistic smartphone ballot 
conditions. 
 While the work by Campbell et al. (2011) was an important first step towards 
establishing a baseline set of usability data, their experiment did not address a crucial 
aspect of the voting-on-a-smartphone experience. In the U.S., rules and regulations vary 
widely by state and jurisdiction, however, there is virtually no upper limit on the number 
of candidates that can be represented in a single race; it is not uncommon for a single race 
to contain upwards of 10 or more candidates. The PBC ordeal has shown how this can 
create usability problems on traditional voting equipment. These problems, however, 
become much more complicated when designing a ballot for a small screen, touch-based, 
handheld mobile phone.  
 To address these concerns, two experiments are reported below that will extend 
and replicate this prior work. In addition to verifying the baseline usability data gathered 
by Campbell et al. (2011), the first experiment examined the effects of long ballot content 
when viewed on a modified version of Campbell et al.’s (2011) MVS, a DRE, and a 
paper ballot. Additionally, described in greater detail below, the second experiment 
replicated the first as well as examined the effects of multi-page review screens and races 
in which more than one candidate can be selected. !  
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 
 METHOD 
  In the U.S., currently, there is not upper limit on the number of candidates that 
can run for any particular office provided they meet the minimum requirements of  
election authority whose ballot they are trying to enlist on. As such, the primary goal of 
experiment one was two-fold. The first objective was to identify how best to display long 
ballot content (i.e., content that is too long to display in its entirety) on a voting system 
optimized for a small-screen handheld mobile device. Further, a trend Internet voting, 
and by extension mobile voting, is already underway both in the U.S. and abroad. In an 
effort to stay ahead of the curve, the second objective of this research was to produce 
research that further extends the baseline usability analysis by Campbell et al. (2011) of 
mobile voting systems. 
Subjects 
 One hundred fifty-two subjects (91 female) from the greater Houston area were 
recruited as subjects for this experiment. There were two overall requirements for 
participation: subjects were required to be 18 years of age or older (i.e., eligible to vote in 
the U.S.) and native English speakers. Recruitment of subjects took place via local online 
and print advertising and subjects were paid $25 for their time, regardless of voting 
performance.  
In order to obtain a more representative sample of the general Houston area 
voting population, subjects were not recruited on the basis of smartphone ownership or 
level of education. Nevertheless, 81 subjects (53%) reported owning a smartphone at the 
time of the experiment. Shown in Table 1, smartphone ownership was approximately 
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evenly distributed while subjects’ level of education was concentrated around a two- or 
four-year degree. There was, however, no evidence of a relationship between the two: 
Χ2(1, 152) = 5.99, p = .11 
Table 1. Distribution of subjects by level of education and smartphone ownership. 
Smartphone 
Ownership 
High School or 
Less 
Associates 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree Total 
Non-Owners 11 28 16 16 71 
Owners 12 39 23 7 81 
Total 23 67 39 23 152 
 
Subjects ranged in age from 18 to 73 years old with a mean age of 42.3 (SD = 
14.6) and had a fairly diverse range of voting histories. Thirty-nine subjects had voted in 
10 or more national elections and 42 had voted in 10 or more non-national (i.e., state and 
local) elections. The vast majority of subjects, however, had voted in fewer than 10 
national (74%) and non-national (72%) elections.  
Experimental Procedure 
 Upon arrival, subjects completed an informed consent form. Subjects were then 
given a set of experiment instructions explaining to them the procedure and what was 
expected of them. Experiment instructions were provided both via script, to minimize 
variations, and in writing. Following the experiment instructions, subjects were given a 
list of candidates to vote for. Once subjects had a chance to read, understand, and ask 
questions about all materials provided to that point, subjects were directed to a voting 
station. Subjects then voted on three voting technologies, being asked to vote exactly the 
same way and to the best of their ability on all three ballots. Directly following each 
individual voting system’s use, subjects were given a SUS questionnaire (Brooke, 1996) 
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to complete about the voting system they had just used. After the voting sessions were 
complete, subjects were given an in-depth interview depending on the particular 
conditions to which they have been assigned. Subjects were then given a demographic 
and voting experience questionnaire (see Appendix A) to complete following which 
subjects were debriefed and paid for their time. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design was mixed, including several between- and within-
subjects variables. In addition to the independent and dependent variables described 
below, the demographic variables education, and smartphone ownership were included as 
independent variables in all analyses. Subjects’ age was also included as a covariate in all 
analyses. 
Independent Variables  
Voting System (3 levels; within-subjects): Subjects voted on the same ballot 
across three voting technologies; once on the MVS (Figure 1), once on the Flash 
VoteBox DRE (Figure 2), and once on a paper ballot (Figure 3). Voting system order was 
counterbalanced and subjects were instructed to vote exactly the same way and to the best 
of their ability on all three voting technologies. 
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Figure 1. An example of the presidential race screen on the MVS. 
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Figure 2. An example of the presidential race screen on the DRE. 
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Figure 3. An example of the paper ballot. 
VOTE BOTH SIDES OF BALLOT
COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
(Vote for One)
•  Corey Behnke REP
•  Jennifer A. Lundeed DEM
COUNTY TREASURER
(Vote for One)
•  Dean Caffee REP
•  Gordon Kallas DEM
HOUSTON I.S.D.
 TRUSTEE, DISTRICT 4
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Atchley REP
•  Lewis Shine REP
•  Jessie Emmer REP
•  Christian Liberatore REP
•  Allan Trabert REP
•  Dona Vasta DEM
•  Odessa Rugh DEM
•  Tia Menges DEM
•  Katherine Ramos IND
•  Tanisha Guarnieri IND
•  Amie Vecchio IND
•  Thomas McKendree IND
•  Ericka Hinze IND
•  Jessie Smith IND
•  Samantha Foos IND
SHERIFF
(Vote for One)
•  Stanley Saari REP
•  Jason Valle DEM
COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR
(Vote for One)
•  Howard Grady
•  Randy H. Clemons
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
(Vote for One)
•  Deborah Kamps
•  Clyde Gayton Jr.
GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
NOVEMBER 4, 2012
• TO VOTE, COMPLETELY FILL IN THE OVAL < >  NEXT TO YOUR CHOICE.
• Use only the marking device provided or a number 2 pencil.
• If you make a mistake, do not hesitate to ask for a new ballot. If you erase or make other marks, 
your vote may not count.
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
(Vote for One)
•  Gordon Bearce
     with Nathan Maclean REP
•  Vernon Stanley Albury
     with Richard Rigby DEM
•  Janette Froman
     with Chris Aponte LIB
•  Jamie Bohnert
     with Nelson Bashore CON
•  Ted Thelan
     with Neil Canady SOC
•  Donald Creviston
     with Darren Manwaring IND
•  Darren Cort
     with Jim Leber IND
•  Althea Weibein
     with Guy Klump IND
•  Fernando Terhaar
     with Allan Rakowski IND
•  Kurt Haislip
     with Margery Bartol IND
CONGRESSIONAL
UNITED STATES SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Cecile Cadieux REP
•  Fern Brzezinski DEM
•  Corey Dery IND
REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS
(Vote for One)
•  Pedro Brouse REP
•  Robert Mettler DEM
STATE
GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Glen Travis Lozier REP
•  Rick Stickles DEM
•  Maurice Humble IND
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Shane Terrio REP
•  Cassie Principe DEM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Speight REP
•  Rick Organ DEM
STATE (Continued)
COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTS
(Vote for One)
•  Therese Gustin IND
•  Greg Converse DEM
COMMISSIONER OF GENERAL 
LAND OFFICE
(Vote for One)
•  Sam Saddler REP
•  Elise Ellzey DEM
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE
(Vote for One)
•  Polly Rylander REP
•  Roberto Aron DEM
RAILROAD COMMISSIONER
(Vote for One)
•  Jillian Balas REP
•  Zachary Minick DEM
STATE SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Ricardo Nigro REP
•  Wesley Steven Millette DEM
STATE REPRESENTATIVE
DISTRICT 134
(Vote for One)
•  Petra Bencomo REP
•  Susanne Rael DEM
MEMBER 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT 2
(Vote for One)
•  Peter Varga REP
•  Mark Baber DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT
PLACE 3
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Grasty DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, 
PLACE 2
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Plouffe REP
•  Derrick Melgar DEM
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Race Type (4 levels; within-subjects): There were two long-content races, 17 two- 
or three-candidate races, two non-partisan races, and six ballot referenda on each ballot. 
On each ballot, the first long-content race was the very first race, the presidential race, 
and contained seven candidates with the following political affiliations (listed in the order 
they appeared): Republican, Democratic, Socialist, Constitutionalist, Independent, 
Libertarian, Green Party. The second long-content race was the 18th race, for Houston 
I.S.D. Trustee, and contained ten candidates with the following political affiliations 
(listed in the order they appeared): 4 x Republican, 2 x Democratic, 4 x Independent. The 
first three of these race types can be seen in the paper ballot shown in Figure 3.  
Error Type (4 levels; within-subjects): Subjects had the potential to make one of 
four mutually exclusive errors per race. The first error type, wrong choice errors, was 
defined as making a selection other than the one intended (e.g., voting for Bob instead of 
Jill). The second error type, overvote errors, was defined as making more then the 
allowed number of selections within a single race (e.g., voting for Bob and Jill when only 
one vote is allowed). It is important to note, however, that both the MVS and Flash 
VoteBox voting system, like most commercially available DREs today, did not allow this 
type of error. It was, however, possible to make this type of error on the paper ballot. The 
third error type, omission errors, was defined as not voting in a contest when the intent 
was to do so (e.g., forgetting to vote in the race for “County Dog Catcher”). Finally, the 
fourth error type, extra vote errors, was defined as the opposite of omission errors. When 
a vote was cast in a contest in which the intent was an omission, that vote was considered 
an error. 
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Display Method (2 levels; between-subjects): Two methods of displaying the long 
ballot content were used on each electronic voting system. The first method, scrolling, 
required subjects to scroll the current page up or down to view content that is displayed 
below the fold. The second method, pagination, required subjects to navigate to a new 
screen to view content that was too long for one screen. Both display methods were as 
similar as possible across both electronic voting systems (see Figure 4 and Figure 5) and 
subjects were randomly assigned to a display method. 
  
(A) Scrolling     (B) Paginated 
Figure 4. The (a) scrolling display method (shown is the top 2/3 of the presidential race) and (b) 
paginated display method as seen on the MVS 
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(A) 
 
(B) 
Figure 5. The (a) scrolling display method (shown is the top 2/3 of the presidential race) and (b) 
paginated display method as seen on the DRE voting system. 
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Slate Affiliation (2 levels; between-subjects): All subjects in experiment one 
received one of two lists of candidates to vote for; also known as a slate (for example 
slates used in this experiment, see Appendix B). The first list directed votes primarily for 
Democratic candidates (85% of the time) while the second list directed votes primarily 
for Republican candidates (85% of the time). Subjects were randomly assigned to a slate 
affiliation. 
 Slate Candidate Position (2 levels; between-subjects): All subjects were directed 
to vote for a candidate, in both of the long-content races that were either above or below 
the fold meaning they were either immediately visible on the screen to the subject (above 
the fold) or were not immediately visible on the screen to the subject (below the fold). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to a slate candidate position. Sample slates can be 
found in  
Dependent Variables  
Effectiveness: The measurement of voting system effectiveness was accomplished 
through the examination of ballot errors tabulated by contest, by ballot, and by error type. 
All errors were defined as deviations from the slate provided to the subjects. 
Efficiency: The measurement of voting system efficiency was accomplished 
through the recording of ballot completion times. Ballot completion times, for all three 
voting technologies, were measured using a stopwatch beginning when subjects entered 
the voting booth and ending when subjects exited the voting booth.  
 Satisfaction: Satisfaction was measured through the administration of the System 
Usability Scale (SUS; Brooke, 1996). The SUS is a 10-question usability assessment 
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using Likert scales. The SUS was administered directly following the use of each voting 
system in order to capture subjects’ immediate impressions. 
Materials 
Two electronic voting technologies were used in this experiment. The first 
electronic voting technology, the MVS, was a custom-built mobile Internet application 
developed entirely in JavaScript. The user interface (UI) was designed to provide voters 
the capability to vote in a mock election with an experience similar to that of 
commercially available DREs (see Figure 6 & Figure 7). The MVS required voters to 
view every race sequentially as direct navigation models have been shown to 
substantially increase voting omission (Greene, 2008). Subjects navigated the ballot page 
by touching arrows at the bottom of the screen corresponding to the direction they wish 
to move. In addition, subjects were able to navigate backwards, view additional on-screen 
instructions, and change votes as needed using the touchscreen interface. While 
navigating the MVS’s ballot, subjects were able to make voting selections by touching 
anywhere within the white box that contains the candidate’s name. After participants had 
seen every race, a review screen was presented with their choices made in each race as 
well as orange highlighting of any race in which there was an omission. The review 
screen allowed participants to go directly to skipped races (or races they made a mistake 
in) by touching anywhere in the orange section. On the review screen, subjects had to 
scroll down to the bottom of the screen, past all their selections, to finally submit their 
votes. 
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(A)             (B)            (C) 
 
   
(D)             (E)            (F) 
Figure 6. Series of screen shots of the MVS. Panel (A) is the initial instruction screen, panel (B) 
is the first candidate race, panel (C) is the fifth candidate race, panel (D) is the sixth candidate 
race, panel (E) is the 20th candidate race with a selection made, and panel (F) is the top of the 
first ballot proposition (22nd race). 
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(A)              (B)            (C) 
 
    
(D)              (E)            (F) 
Figure 7. Series of screen shots of the MVS. Panel (A) is the bottom of the first ballot proposition 
(22nd race), panel (B) is the top of the review screen (28th screen), panel (C) is the middle of the 
review screen showing a previously made selection, panel (D) is the middle of the review screen, 
panel (E) is the submission button and panel (F) is the submission confirmation screen (30th 
screen). 
Ballots 
 The ballots used in this experiment resembled the ballots used in previous 
research (Campbell & Byrne, 2009; Everett et al., 2008), featuring 21 single-selection 
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candidate races and six yes-no propositions. There were two fundamental changes, 
however, made to the ballots used in this research. The 21 partisan single-selection 
candidate races used previously were divided into 19 partisan single-selection candidate 
races, seen first, and two nonpartisan single-selection candidate races, seen last. 
Additionally, the ballots used in this experiment included two long-content races. The 
first long-content race was the very first race; the race for United States president. The 
second long-content race was the 18th race; the race for Houston I.S.D. trustee.  
 Candidate names on the ballot used in this experiment were fictional, as this has 
been shown not to affect voting performance whilst at the same time preventing 
recognition effects (Greene et al., 2006). Additionally, this ballot also featured real party 
names (e.g., Democrat, Republican, and Independent) to preserve a degree of realism in 
the face of conducting a mock election in a laboratory setting. Lastly, there was no 
straight-party voting ballot option and the propositions were fictional yet representative 
of those seen recently in Houston area elections. The full ballot, in paper form, can be 
found in Appendix C. !  
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RESULTS 
Outliers 
 In the analysis of error rates below 14 subjects who produced more than four 
errors on all three voting systems were considered outliers and removed from this 
analysis. Anecdotal evidence from subjects’ verbal comments suggests that some of these 
subjects refused to vote according to the slate provided to them and instead voted along 
their political ideologies. One additional subject was excluded from the analysis of error 
due to a technical error that prevented the recording of data from the mobile voting 
system. 
Similarly, in the analysis of ballot completion times, three different subjects were 
removed from the analysis of ballot completion times for having at least one ballot 
completion time that exceeded three inter-quartile ranges from either above the upper 
hinge or below the lower hinge relative to their own mean ballot completion time across 
all three ballots.  
Effectiveness 
 Two ANCOVAs were used to analyze voting system error rates. The first 
ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 4 (error type) X 3 (race type) X 4 (education) X 2 
(slate candidate position) mixed-design ANCOVA, with age as a covariate, used with 
only those factors which applied to all three voting systems (i.e., voting system, slate 
candidate position, and education). The covariate, subjects’ age, was not a statistically 
reliable predictor of ballot errors and thus will not be discussed further. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 2, the vast majority of voting errors occurred 
when subjects were voting on one the electronic voting systems. Subjects committed half 
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as many voting errors voting on the paper ballot than when voting on the DRE voting 
system and nearly a third as many voting errors than when voting on the MVS.  
Table 2. Distribution of errors per voting system. 
Voting System Ballots Cast Total Errors Ballots w/ at least 1 error Mean # Errors Std. Dev. 
Mobile 138 121 19 .88 3.54 
DRE 138 110 23 .80 3.04 
Paper 138 43 12 .31 1.34 
Total 414 274 54   
 
 Although comparable to each other, shown in Figure 8, across all other factors, 
there was a main effect of voting system such that the electronic voting systems elicited 
the highest error rates from subjects, F(2, 256) = 3.74, p = .032, MSE = .01, η2p = .03. 
Subjects’ levels of education moderated this relationship between voting system and error 
rate such that subjects who reported the lowest level of education committed the largest 
majority of the errors (see Figure 9), F(6, 256) = 2.16, p = .048, MSE = .01, η2p = .05. 
Across levels of education and voting systems, there was also a main effect of race type 
indicating that the long-content races were a sizable source of voting errors (see Figure 
10), F(2, 256) = 5.08, p = .007, MSE = .01, η2p = .04.  
Similar to the interaction with voting system, subjects’ levels of education 
moderated error rates per race type. Shown in Figure 11, subjects who reported the lowest 
level of education produced error rates in the long-content races that were twice as large 
as any other race type and education combination, F(6, 256) = 3.36, p = .003, MSE = .01, 
η2p = .07. The three-way interaction between voting system, race type, and subjects’ 
levels of education was also statistically reliable confirming that when the lower educated 
subjects voted on the electronic voting systems they incurred especially high error rates 
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in the long-content races (see Figure 12), F(12, 512) = 2.16, p = .012, MSE = .003, η2p = 
.05.  
Subjects’ level of education also had and effect on the type of error that they 
made. Shown in Figure 13, subjects with the lowest level of education made substantially 
more wrong choice voting errors when using either of the electronic voting systems then 
they did when using the paper voting system, F(18, 768) = 3.00, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2p 
= .07. Finally, shown in Figure 14, subjects who reported the lowest level of education 
made substantially more wrong choice voting errors in the long-content races compared 
to the propositions or standard races, F(18, 768) = 3.99, p < .001, MSE = .01, η2p = .09. 
 
Figure 8. Mean error rate (%) as a function of voting system. 
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Figure 9. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' self-reported level of education and voting 
system. 
 
Figure 10. Mean error rate (%) as a function of race type. 
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Figure 11. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' self-reported level of education and race 
type. 
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(A) MVS      (B) DRE 
 
(C) Paper 
Figure 12. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' level of education and race type for (a) 
the MVS, (b) the DRE voting system and, (c) the paper voting system. 
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(A) MVS      (B) DRE 
 
(C) Paper 
Figure 13. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' level of education and error type for (a) 
the MVS, (b) the DRE voting system and, (c) the paper voting system. 
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(A) Long-content races      (B) Propositions 
 
(C) Standard races 
Figure 14. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' level of education and error type for (a) 
the long-content races, (b) the propositions and, (c) the standard races. 
 
High School 
Degree
Associates 
Degree
Bachelor's 
Degree
Graduate 
Degree
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
M
ea
n 
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
(%
) ±
 1
 S
EM
Level of Education
Overvote
Omission
Wrong Choice
Extra Vote
High School 
Degree
Associates 
Degree
Bachelor's 
Degree
Graduate 
Degree
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
M
ea
n 
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
(%
) ±
 1
 S
EM
Level of Education
Overvote
Omission
Wrong Choice
Extra Vote
High School 
Degree
Associates 
Degree
Bachelor's 
Degree
Graduate 
Degree
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
M
ea
n 
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
(%
) ±
 1
 S
EM
Level of Education
Overvote
Omission
Wrong Choice
Extra Vote
!!
34!
 Across levels of education and voting systems, the long-content races generated 
substantially higher error wrong choice voting error rates when the to-be-voted-for 
candidate (TBVC) was positioned at the bottom of the races as compared to when it was 
positioned at the top of the races, (see Figure 15), F(18, 768) = 3.99, p < .001, MSE = .01, 
η2p = .09. Across all error types and levels of education, the MVS generated more voting 
errors when subjects encountered the long-content races and the TBVC was positioned at 
the bottom of the races than either the DRE or paper voting systems did though, when the 
TBVC was positioned at the top of the long-content races the MVS outperformed either 
of the other voting systems (see Figure 16), F(4, 512) = 3.03, p = .024, MSE = .003, η2p = 
.02. Similarly, across race types, though likely driven by the presence of the long-content 
races, wrong choice errors were substantially more prevalent for both the MVS and the 
DRE voting system when the TBVC was positioned at the bottom of the long-content 
races than when it was positioned at the top of the long-content races (see Figure 17), 
F(6, 768) = 2.44 = .021, MSE = .008, η2p = .02. 
 
!!
35!
  
(A) Top       (B) Bottom 
Figure 15. Mean error rate (%) as a function of race type and error type when the TBVC was (a) 
at the top of the race and (b) at the bottom of the race. Note: the notion of a TBVC does not apply 
to the standard races or propositions, as in those races all candidates were visible immediately. 
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(A) Top       (B) Bottom 
Figure 16. Mean error rate (%) as a function of voting system and race type when the TBVC was 
(a) at the top of the race and (b) at the bottom of the race. Note: the notion of a TBVC does not 
apply to the standard races or propositions, as in those races all candidates were visible 
immediately. 
  
(A) Top       (B) Bottom 
Figure 17. Mean error rate (%) as a function of voting system and error type when the TBVC was 
(a) at the top of the race and (b) at the bottom of the race.  
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The second ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 4 (error type) X 3 (race type) X 
4 (education) X 2 (slate candidate position) mixed-design ANCOVA, with age as a 
covariate, incorporating those factors that applied only to the electronic voting systems 
(i.e., voting system, display method, and smartphone ownership). Across all other factors, 
both the MVS and the DRE voting system were highly susceptible to wrong choice errors 
(see Figure 18), F(3, 396) = 4.93, p = .002, MSE = .02, η2p = .04, and, shown in Figure 
19, the long-content races were particularly problematic for both electronic voting 
systems, F(2, 264) = 3.69, p = .031, MSE = .01, η2p = .03, incurring error rates that were 
twice as high, on average, than those for either the proposition or standard races. This 
relationship was also moderated by the way in which the long-content races were 
displayed and whether no not the subjects owned a smartphone at the time of the 
experiment. Shown in Figure 20a, subjects who did not own a smartphone at the time of 
the experiment and were shown the long-content races as single scrollable pages 
committed many more voting errors than other subjects, F(2, 264) = 9.13, p < .001, MSE 
= .01, η2p = .06. 
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Figure 18. Mean error rate (%) as a function of error type and electronic voting system. 
 
 
Figure 19. Mean error rate (%) across electronic voting systems as a function of race type. 
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(A) Smartphone non-owners.   (B) Smartphone owners. 
Figure 20. Mean error rate (%) across electronic voting systems as a function of race type and 
long-content display method for (a) smartphone owners and (b) smartphone non-owners. Note: 
the notions of a scrolling and pagination do not apply to the standard races or propositions, as in 
those races all candidates were visible immediately. 
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Efficiency 
Two ANCOVAs were used to analyze voting system error rates. The first 
ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 2 (slate candidate position) X 2 (education) mixed-
design ANCOVA1, with subjects’ age as a covariate, incorporating those factors that 
applied to all three voting systems (i.e., voting system, slate candidate position, and 
education). As shown in Figure 21, the distributions of ballot completion times were 
slightly positively skewed for all three voting systems, however, slightly more so for the 
MVS.  
 
Figure 21. Distribution of ballot completion times, in seconds, by voting system. Squares 
represent means. 
Additionally, the covariate, subjects’ age, was statistically reliable, R2 = .22, F(1, 
148) = 41.48, p < .001, MSE = 9272, η2p = .18, indicating that as voters age they tend to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There was some evidence non-homogenous slopes such that the paper ballot's slope differed from the electronic 
voting systems' slopes. 
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take longer to complete their ballots. There were, however, no main effects or 
interactions involving slate candidate position and thus this factor will not be discussed 
further.  
Shown in Figure 21, subjects took slightly longer to complete their ballots when 
using the MVS than any of the other voting systems. The DRE voting closely followed 
the MVS and the paper ballot was the slowest of the three, F(2, 280) = 9.41, p < .001, 
MSE = 9835, η2p = .06, however, this effect is likely to be inconsequential as the 
magnitude of the effect was quite small; approximately 60 seconds between the MVS and 
the paper ballot. Further, the time lost due to using the MVS would likely be more than 
compensated for by not needing to travel to a polling place. Subjects’ self-reported level 
of education was also linked to their ballot completion times. Though the causal 
relationship is not entirely clear, across ages and voting systems subjects who reported 
the lowest levels of education took longer to complete their ballots (see Figure 22), F(3, 
140) = 8.33, p < .001, MSE = 24677, η2p = .15. 
 
Figure 22. Mean ballot completion times, in seconds, as a function of subjects' level of education. 
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The second ANCOVA was a 2 (electronic voting system) X 2 (display method) X 
2 (smartphone ownership) mixed-design ANCOVA, with subjects’ age as a covariate, 
incorporating those factors, display method and smartphone ownership, which applied 
only to the electronic voting systems. There were, however, no main effects or 
interactions involving display method and thus this factor will not be discussed further. 
Alluded to above, however, subjects were reliably slower when using the MVS than 
when using the DRE voting system (see  Figure 23), F(1, 144) = 5.49, p = .022, MSE = 
11384, η2p = .04. Again, this relatively small effect would likely be inconsequential for 
the reasons discussed above. Smartphone ownership, however, across electronic voting 
systems, was also a determinant of ballot completion times. Shown in Figure 24, subjects 
who owned a smartphone at the time of the experiment completed their ballots over 100 
seconds faster, on average, than subjects who did not own a smartphone at the time of the 
experiment, F(1, 144) = 12.56, p = .001, MSE = 23810, η2p = .08, perhaps further 
indicating a lack of familiarity with the technology lead to longer ballot completion 
times. 
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 Figure 23. Mean ballot completion time, in seconds, as a function of electronic voting system. 
 
Figure 24. Mean ballot completion time for the electronic voting systems, in seconds, as a 
function of smartphone ownership !  
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Subjective Satisfaction 
Two ANCOVA’s were used to analyze voting system SUS ratings. The first 
ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 2 (slate candidate position) X 2 (education) mixed-
design ANCOVA, with subjects’ age as a covariate, used to determine the reliability of 
those factors which applied to all three voting systems (i.e., voting system, slate 
candidate position, and education). There were, however, no main effects or interactions 
involving slate candidate position nor education and thus these factors will not be 
discussed further. 
The distributions of SUS ratings were slightly negatively skewed for all three 
voting systems, however, slightly more so for the MVS. This is likely due to a majority 
of the SUS ratings falling at or near the maximum score of 100. Furthermore, the 
covariate, subjects’ age, was statistically reliable, accounting for 7% of the variance in 
SUS ratings across voting systems, R2 = .07, F(1, 149) = 10.7, p = .001, MSE = 113, η2p = 
.07, indicating that older adults tended to be the most critical raters across all three voting 
systems. Finally, entirely consistent with previous research, all three voting systems 
received favorable SUS scores across ages, with the DRE voting system having been 
rated the highest, the MVS second highest, and the paper ballot a very close behind (see 
Figure 25), F(2, 282) = 11.7, p < .001, MSE = 232, η2p = .08. 
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Figure 25. Distribution of SUS scores as a function of voting system. Squares represent means. 
 
The second ANCOVA was a 2 (electronic voting system) X 2 (display method) X 
2 (smartphone ownership) mixed-design ANCOVA, with subjects’ age as a covariate, 
incorporating only those factors, display method and smartphone ownership, which 
applied only to the electronic voting systems. There were, however, no main effects or 
interactions involving display method and thus this factor will not be discussed further. 
Nevertheless, shown in Figure 26, subjects who did not own a smartphone were more 
likely to be dissatisfied with the MVS than subjects who did own a smartphone, F(1, 146) 
= 7.68, p = .006, MSE = 180, η2p = .05, indicating that subjects were sensitive to their 
level of familiarity with the voting technology. 
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Figure 26. Mean SUS rating as a function of voting system and smartphone ownership.  
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DISCUSSION 
 The results from experiment one demonstrate three things clearly. First, low 
education voters are particularly at risk for making voting errors on the electronic voting 
systems. Though, it is unclear whether this was a consequence of lower familiarity with 
the electronic devices used in this experiment or other mitigating factors. 
Second, the long-content races elicited substantially higher error rates than either 
the propositions or standard races. While true primarily for the electronic voting system, 
candidates below the fold were particularly susceptible to being subject to wrong choice 
and omission voting errors. This has important implications for candidates who do not 
align themselves with the major political parties as on most ballots across the U.S. the 
major political parties are featured at the top of the race. These results suggest that 
candidates appearing below the fold when the number of candidates in the race is too 
many to be displayed on a single screen will be at a disadvantage. 
 Finally, on the electronic voting systems, the scrolling display method for the 
long-content races was particularly prone to wrong choice voting errors for smartphone 
non-owners. Anecdotal evidence from the observation of subjects suggests that is likely 
attributable to a lack of experience or knowledge about how to manipulate the MVS’s 
user interface. Many subjects were observed having difficulty scrolling the individual 
long-content races up and down to view candidates above or below the fold. It follows 
then that the MVS would be particularly prone to wrong choice errors in these races 
because the action sequence required to select a candidate and the action sequence 
required to scroll the screen up and down share an important step. In other words, the 
voter has to first touch the screen to do either. When attempting to scroll the screen up 
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and down, if not timed correctly, it is relatively easy to select an alternate candidate by 
mistake before the scrolling actually occurs. 
 It could be argued, however, that the results from experiment one were in part a 
product of the artificial nature of the voting environment. Subjects in experiment one 
were in fact given a list of candidates to vote for and 50% of them were directed to vote 
for candidates that appeared below the fold. While directing subjects who to vote for was 
a necessity in order to ensure a sizeable portion of subjects actually cast a down-race 
vote, this is almost certainly a much higher down-race voting rate than would occur in an 
actual nation election.  
 It is also possible that many of the errors incurred by lower educated subjects 
occurred simply because they did not realize they had committed them. In experiment 
one, the review screen on the mobile voting system was a single scrollable page. On the 
DRE voting system it was a single page displaying all the races and choices in a smaller 
font. In this context, it may be just as important how the review screen is displayed to 
voters as how long ballot content is presented them to them while they are making 
choices. In this sense, the review screen is simply another form of long ballot content in 
which the context is slightly different; that is, the context has shifted from making a 
selection to verifying a selection.  
 Additional research is needed then to address these concerns and add clarity and 
context to the results of experiment one. Experiment two, described below, addresses 
these concerns in the following ways. First, in experiment two voters were allowed to 
read about, and vote for whomever they wished thereby relieving the artificiality of the 
slates. Second, in experiment two the display method of the review screens found on the 
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electronic voting systems was manipulated in the same way the display method for the 
long-content races was in experiment one. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 
 The second experiment was a replication and extension of the first. In experiment 
two, the display method from experiment one that elicited the highest voting performance 
(i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction), pagination, was utilized for the entirety 
of experiment two. In addition to verifying the effects of long ballot content have on 
voting performance the goals of experiment two were three-fold. First, experiment two 
examined multi-vote races. In many U.S. elections, particularly local elections, voters 
have the ability to vote for more than one candidate for in a single race (e.g., multiple 
school board seats). The second experiment examined how this specific ballot provision, 
the ability to vote for more than one candidate at a time, affects voting performance. The 
ability to vote for more than one candidate per race, also known as k of n voting, has not 
been previously studied in a controlled laboratory setting and currently it is unknown 
what effects, if any, this ballot provision has on voting performance. 
 Second, subjects in experiment two were given free choice as to whom they wished 
to vote for. Subjects in experiment two were given a voter guide, modeled after the 
League of Women Voters document (League of Women Voters, 2012), to read and were 
subsequently allowed to vote for any candidate(s) they wished.  
 Finally, for the electronic voting systems the candidate selection screens may not be 
the only place in which long ballot content may be problematic. On ballots with several 
candidate races and propositions, a single-page review screen has the potential to become 
visually cluttered. One solution, reducing font sizes to accommodate a large number of 
contests on a single screen likely makes review screens harder read or scan while also 
making it more difficult to interact with individual races. In experiment two subjects saw 
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one of two alternatives. Like the display methods of long-content races in experiment 
one, subjects in experiment two were shown a review screen that was either paginated 
(such that content is spread across two or more “pages”) or a review screen in which the 
content was scrollable.!
 METHOD 
The goals of experiment two were separated into three parts. In the U.S. many 
elections feature races in which more than one candidate at a time. Thus, the first 
objective of experiment two was to identify the effects these multi-vote races have on the 
usability of ballots used across voting technologies. Further, in experiment one, subjects 
were told who to vote for. While this is somewhat necessary in order to observe events 
that are deemed likely to be low frequency in nature, it certainly adds to the artificiality 
of voting in a laboratory setting. Thus, the second objective was to allow subjects to vote 
for whomever they wished. Finally, the review screens found commonly in electronic 
voting technologies present voters with a unique context in which they are now verifying 
selections rather than making them. As the number of races and candidates grow the 
complexity of displaying this information, especially on a small-screen mobile device, 
grows. Thus, the final objective was to extend the display method results of experiment 
one to the electronic review screens in experiment two.  
Subjects 
One hundred forty four subjects (75 female) from the greater Houston area were 
recruited as subjects for experiment two. Identical to experiment one, there were two 
overall requirements for participation; subjects were required to be 18 years of age or 
older (i.e., eligible to vote in the U.S.), and native English speakers. Recruitment of 
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subjects took place via local online and print advertising and subjects were paid $25 for 
their time, regardless of voting performance. Finally, like in experiment one, in order to 
obtain a more representative sample of the general Houston area voting population, 
subjects were not recruited on the basis of smartphone ownership or level of education. 
Nevertheless, 94 subjects (65%) reported owning a smartphone at the time of the 
experiment. Shown in Table 3, smartphone ownership was slightly skewed towards 
ownership, except for the lowest level of education, however, overall level of education 
was approximately evenly distributed. There was, however, a relationship between the 
two such that subjects with the lowest level of education reported not owning a 
smartphone more often than expected: Χ2(1, 152) = 5.99, p = .11. 
Table 3. Distribution of subjects by level of education and smartphone ownership. 
Smartphone 
Ownership 
High School or 
Less 
Associates 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree Total 
Non-Owners 14 18 12 6 50 
Owners 5 40 32 17 94 
Total 19 58 44 23 144 
 
Subjects ranged in age from 19 to 81 years old with a mean age of 39.9 (SD = 
14.9) and, similar to experiment one, had a fairly diverse range of voting histories. 
Twenty-two subjects had voted in 10 or more national elections and 28 had voted in 10 or 
more non-national (i.e., state and local) elections. The vast majority of subjects, however, 
had voted in fewer than 10 national (85%) and non-national (78%) elections. In order to 
obtain a more representative sample of the general voting population, subjects were not 
recruited on the basis of smartphone ownership. Nevertheless, 73 subjects (51%) reported 
owning a smartphone at the time of the experiment. 
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Experimental Procedure 
The procedure for experiment two was identical to experiment one except that 
after all voting sessions were complete, subjects were given an exit interview to ascertain 
for whom they intended to vote. 
Experimental Design 
Except where noted below, experiment two was similar to experiment one. The 
design for experiment two was mixed, including several between- and within-subjects 
variables. As with experiment one, demographic variables such as education and 
smartphone ownership were also be included as independent variables in all analyses. 
Further, subjects’ age was again included as a covariate in all appropriate analyses. 
Independent Variables  
The within-subjects variables voting system, race type, and error type from 
experiment one were included in experiment two. In addition to these within-subjects 
variables, the following between-subjects variables will be included in experiment two: 
 Multi-Vote Race Overvote Behavior (3 levels; between-subjects):  When a subject 
attempted to overvote in the 18th race (the race for Houston I.S.D. Trustee) both the 
MVS and DRE handled this situation in one of three possible ways. In the first condition, 
the replace last condition, the voting system automatically deselected the last candidate 
chosen and selected the overvoted candidate in its stead. In the second condition, the fail 
immediately condition, the voting system warned the subject that they have already made 
the maximum number of selections in that race immediately. Subjects were then required 
to manually deselect a previously selected candidate in order to select a new one. In the 
third condition, the fail on navigation condition, the voting system warned the subject 
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that they have already made the maximum number of selections in that race as they tried 
to navigate away from the race. 
 Review Screen Display Method (2 levels; between-subjects): Two methods of 
displaying the review screen content were used on each electronic voting system. The 
first method, scrolling, required subjects to scroll the current page up or down to view 
content that is displayed below the fold. The second method, pagination, required 
subjects to navigate to a new page to view content that was too long for one page. Both 
display methods were as similar as possible across both electronic voting systems. 
Subjects were also randomly assigned to a display method. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for experiment two were identical to experiment one. 
Effectiveness, however, was calculated slightly differently. Effectiveness was determined 
using a majority rules scheme. Subjects provided four sources of voting intent: an exit 
interview (to determine who they intended to vote for), the first technology’s ballot, the 
second technology’s ballot, and the third technology’s ballot. Any ballot selection that 
did not match the other three was considered an error. 
Materials 
With two exceptions (see “Voter Guides” below), the materials used in 
experiment two were identical to those used in experiment one. 
Voter Guides 
 Unlike experiment one in which subjects were given a slate of candidates to vote 
for, subjects in experiment two were given a voters guide (modeled after: League of 
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Women Voters, 2012) to read and were subsequently allowed to vote for whomever they 
wanted to. The full voters guide can be viewed in Appendix D. 
Ballots 
The ballots used in experiment two were altered slightly from experiment one. 
The 18th race, the race for Houston I.S.D. Trustee (shown in Figure 2), was not a single 
selection race. Instead that race was altered to allow voter to choose up to three 
candidates (i.e., a k-of-n race).  
RESULTS 
Outliers 
In the analysis of error rates below one subject who produced more than four 
errors on all three voting systems was considered an outlier and removed from the 
analysis of error rates.  
Similarly, in the analysis of ballot completion times, 10 subjects (separate from 
those removed in the analysis for error rates) were removed from the analysis of ballot 
completion times for having at least one ballot completion time that exceeded three inter-
quartile ranges from either above the upper hinge or below the lower hinge relative to 
their own mean ballot completion time across all three ballots. These subjects removed 
for producing abnormal ballot completion times relative to themselves were all observed 
reading the voter’s guide while casting their ballot. One additional subject was removed 
from all three analyses due to a failure to report their age precluding them any analysis in 
which age was used as a covariate. 
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Effectiveness 
Unlike experiment one, error type was not included in the analysis of error rates 
for study two. This is due to the ambiguous nature of error attribution in multi-vote races 
and reliance of this analysis on mutually exclusive error types. For example, consider the 
case in which a subject intends to vote for the top three candidates in the 18th race (i.e., 
the “choose three” Houston ISD race). If that subject were to accidently select the second 
candidate first and then simply select the next two candidates down without noticing, that 
would clearly be a voting error. The type of error it is, however, is ambiguous. In this 
example, the first candidate, the one missed, would be, by definition, an omission error. 
The third candidate selected (the fourth candidate down), however, could simultaneously 
be a wrong choice error. In essence, a reasonable argument could be made for attributing 
this case as an omission error or a wrong choice error or both. As a result, errors in the 
18th race were coded simply as either present or not without attribution of error type in 
order to alleviate this ambiguity. 
Shown in Table 4, nearly as many voting errors occurred on the paper ballot as 
did on both electronic voting methods combined. The DRE voting system produced the 
smallest number of voting errors with the MVS producing second highest number of 
voting errors. 
Table 4. Distribution of errors per voting system. 
Voting System Ballots Cast Total Errors Ballots w/ at least 1 error Mean # Errors Std. Dev. 
Mobile 142 100 39 .69 1.69 
DRE 142 89 38 .62 1.57 
Paper 142 159 44 1.1 2.28 
Total 426 348 121   
 
!!
57!
Cross-System Factors 
A 3 (voting system) X 3 (race type) X 4 (education) mixed-design ANCOVA, 
with age as a covariate and utilizing the data from 142 subjects, incorporating only those 
factors which applied to all three voting systems. The covariate, subjects’ age, was not a 
statistically reliable predictor of ballot errors nor were there any main effects or 
interactions involving the within subjects factors of voting system or race type. Shown in 
Table 5 are the overall mean error rates per level of education. While suggestive that 
subjects with lower levels of education had trouble with the paper ballot, the main effect 
of education was not statistically reliable, F(3, 137) = 2.24, p = .09, MSE = .04, η2p = .05. 
Table 5. Mean error rate (%) as a function of subjects' self-reported level of education. 
Percentages in parentheses represent standard errors of the mean. 
 Level of Education 
Voting System High School or Less Associates Degree Bachelor’s Degree Graduate Degree 
MVS 3.3% (1.8%) 
3.4% 
(1.0%) 
3.0% 
(1.1%) 
3.5% 
(1.6%) 
DRE 6.2% (1.8%) 
3.3% 
(1.0%) 
2.6% 
(1.1%) 
1.0% 
(1.5%) 
Paper 7.3% (3.5%) 
11.0% 
(1.9%) 
4.2% 
(2.2%) 
2.3% 
(3.0%) 
 
Voting Above or Below the Fold 
A 3 (voting system) X 3 (race type) X 2 (candidate position) mixed-design 
ANCOVA, with age as a covariate was used incorporating only those factors which 
applied to all voting systems when subjects consistently voted above or below the fold. 
This ANCOVA was applied to only the 58 subjects who’s intent was to vote consistently 
either above or below the fold in both long-content races across all three voting systems. 
Education was not included in this ANCOVA as the subset of data used was a small 
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fraction of the full data set and the inclusion of education resulted in several empty cells. 
The covariate, subjects’ age, was not a statistically reliable predictor of ballot errors and 
will not be discussed further.  
Shown in Figure 27, subjects’ intention to vote for a candidate below the fold in 
the long-content races had a considerable negative effect on the observed error rates in 
those races for both the MVS and the paper voting system, F(1.9, 104.2)2 = 3.86, p = 
.031, MSE = .02, η2p = .07. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Degrees of freedom adjusted via Greenhouse-Geisser for violations of sphericity. 
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(A) The MVS.     (B) The DRE voting system. 
 
(C) The paper voting system. 
Figure 27. Mean error rate (%) as a function of race type and candidate position for (a) the MVS, 
(b) the DRE voting system, and (c) the paper voting system. Note: the notions of being above or 
below the fold do not apply to the standard races or propositions, as in those races all candidates 
were visible immediately. 
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Electronic Voting System Factors 
A 2 (electronic voting system) X 3 (race type) X 2 (review screen display method) 
x 2 (smartphone ownership) mixed-design ANCOVA, with age as a covariate, was used 
to determine the reliability of those factors which applied only to the electronic voting 
systems. This ANCOVA was applied to all 142 subjects. The covariate, subjects’ age, 
was not a statistically reliable predictor of ballot errors and will not be discussed further.   
Shown in Figure 28, when the review screen was displayed as a single scrollable 
page subjects made more errors on the MVS than the DRE voting system while when the 
review screen was displayed as a series of paginated screens there was little difference 
between the MVS and DRE voting system, F(1, 137) = 4.54, p = .044, MSE = .01, η2p = 
.03. A simple main effects analysis also found evidence that the difference between 
scrolling and pagination was reliable for the MVS yet not so for the DRE. 
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Figure 28. Mean error rate (%) as a function of electronic voting system and review screen 
display method. 
 
Predicting Errors 
 Four logistic regressions were performed to determine the reliability of predicting 
whether or not subjects would make an error or not in both the presidential race and the 
race for Houston ISD (the long-content race) between both electronic voting systems. 
The criterion for all four regressions was whether or not any error was made in the 
relevant race. The predictors for each regression were: 
1. The review screen’s display method. 
2. Subjects’ smartphone ownership. 
3. Subjects’ self-reported level of education. 
4. Subjects’ age. 
5. Subjects’ intent to vote either above or below the fold in the relevant race. 
6. Race 18 Only: the method with which race 18 failed when an overvote was made. 
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For race one (see Table 6), the presidential race, none of the predictors were statistically 
reliable predictors of whether or not subjects would make an error in that race on the 
MVS. Similarly, on the DRE voting system (see Table 7), none of the predictors were 
statistically reliable predictors of whether or not subjects would make an error in that 
race.  
Table 6. Logistic regression analysis of errors made in race 1 on the MVS. 
Predictor β S.E. Wald’s !2" df p 
Review screen display method 1.14 1.18 0.92 1 .34 
Smartphone ownership -0.10 1.30 0.01 1 .93 
Level of education -17.94 9567.08 0.00 3 .99 
Age -0.03 0.04 0.39 1 .53 
Above / Below the fold  -0.88 1.17 0.57 1 .45 
 
Table 7. Logistic regression analysis of errors made in race 1 on the DRE voting system. 
Predictor β S.E. Wald’s !2" df p 
Review screen display method 0.34 0.89 0.15 1 .70 
Smartphone ownership -0.22 1.05 0.04 1 .84 
Level of education 1.68 1.31 1.64 3 .20 
Age 0.02 0.04 0.27 1 .60 
Above / Below the fold  -0.07 0.95 0.01 1 .94 
 
For race 18 (the Houston ISD race), however, subjects’ intent to vote either above 
or below the fold in that race strongly predicted whether or not they would make an error 
in that race when they voted on the MVS. Shown in Table 8, subjects were much more 
likely to make an error in the 18th race on the MVS when they attempted to vote for 
candidate that was below the fold than when they attempted to vote for a candidate above 
the fold (see also Table 9). Finally, looking at race 18 when subjects were voting on the 
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DRE voting system, none of the predictors were statistically reliable predictors of 
whether or not subjects would make an error in that race (see Table 10). 
 
Table 8. Mean error rate (%) when using the MVS as a function of subjects’ intent to vote above 
or below the fold in the 18th race (the race for Houston ISD). 
Subjects’ Intent N Mean S.E.M. 
Above the fold 66 6.1% 2.9% 
Below the fold 77 19.5% 4.5% 
 
Table 9. Logistic regression analysis of errors made in race 18 on the MVS. 
Predictor β S.E. Wald’s !2" df p 
Review screen display method 0.40 0.54 0.55 1 .46 
Smartphone ownership 0.25 0.62 0.16 1 .69 
Level of education 0.58 1.05 0.30 3 .58 
Age 0.03 0.02 2.86 1 .09 
Above / Below the fold  -1.41 0.62 5.17 1 .02 
Race 18 overvote fail method 0.07 0.69 0.01 2 .91 
  
Table 10. Logistic regression analysis of errors made in race 18 on the DRE voting system. 
Predictor β S.E. Wald’s !2" df p 
Review screen display method 0.21 0.49 0.18 1 .68 
Smartphone ownership -0.18 0.58 0.10 1 .75 
Level of education 0.96 0.89 1.17 3 .28 
Age 0.03 0.02 2.94 1 .09 
Above / Below the fold  -1.18 0.61 3.74 1 .053 
Race 18 overvote fail method -0.73 0.63 1.34 1 .25 
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Efficiency 
 Two ANCOVAs were used to analyze voting system ballot completion times. The 
first ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 4 (level of education) mixed-design 
ANCOVA, with subjects’ age as a covariate, used to determine the reliability of those 
factors which applied to all three voting systems (i.e., voting system and education). 
There were, however, no main effects or interactions involving education and thus it will 
not be discussed any further. 
 Shown in Figure 29, similar to experiment one, the distributions of ballot 
completion times were slightly positively skewed for all three voting systems, however, 
slightly more so for the MVS. Further, like in experiment one, shown in Figure 30, the 
covariate, subjects’ age, was statistically reliable, R2 = .15, F(1, 131) = 22.42, p < .001, 
MSE = 20843, η2p = .15, indicating that as voters age they tend to take longer to complete 
their ballots. Finally, subjects took longer to complete their ballots using one of the 
electronic voting systems with, like in experiment one, the MVS being the slowest voting 
system (see Figure 29), F(2, 256) = 4.32, p = .012, MSE = 36087, η2p = .03. 
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Figure 29. Distribution of ballot completion times as a function of voting system. Squares 
represent means. 
 
 
Figure 30. Ballot completion times as a function of age. 
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 The second ANCOVA was a 2 (electronic voting system) X 2 (review screen 
display method) X 2 (smartphone ownership) X 2 (race 18 overvote fail method) mixed-
design ANCOVA3, with subjects’ age as a covariate, incorporating those factors which 
applied to only the electronic voting systems. There were, however, no main effects or 
interactions involving voting system, smartphone ownership, or race 18 overvote fail 
method and thus these factors will not be discussed further. 
 The method in which the review screen was displayed, however, had an effect on 
how quickly subjects completed their ballots. Across electronic voting systems, subjects 
who saw the review screen as a single scrollable page completed their ballots nearly 100 
seconds faster than subjects who saw the review screen as a series of pages (see Figure 
31), F(1, 120) = 6.38, p = .013, MSE = 60468, η2p = .05. 
 
Figure 31. Mean ballot completion time, in seconds, as a function of review screen display 
method. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 There was some evidence non-homogenous slopes such that the paper ballot's slope differed from the electronic 
voting systems' slopes. 
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Subjective Satisfaction 
Two ANCOVAs were used to analyze voting system SUS scores. The first 
ANCOVA was a 3 (voting system) X 4 (level of education) mixed-design ANCOVA, 
with subjects’ age as a covariate, incorporating those factors that applied to all three 
voting systems (i.e., voting system and education). There were, however, no main effects 
or interactions involving voting system or education and thus these factors will not be 
discussed any further. 
 Consistent with experiment one, the distributions of SUS ratings were slightly 
negatively skewed for all three voting systems. This is likely due to a majority of the SUS 
ratings falling at or near the maximum score of 100. Furthermore, the covariate, subjects’ 
age, was statistically reliable accounting for 3% of the variance in SUS ratings across 
voting systems, R2 = .03, F(1, 141) = 4.95, p = .022, MSE = 112, η2p = .03, indicating that 
older adults tended to be the most critical raters across all three voting systems. 
The second ANCOVA was a 2 (electronic voting system) X 2 (review screen 
display method) X 2 (smartphone ownership) X 2 (race 18 overvote fail method) mixed-
design ANCOVA, with subjects’ age as a covariate, incorporating those factors which 
applied to only the electronic voting systems. There were, however, no main effects or 
interactions involving electronic voting system and thus it will not be discussed any 
further. 
Across electronic voting systems, however, subjects’ smartphone ownership 
influenced their mean rating of the electronic voting systems. Smartphone non-owners 
rated the electronic voting systems reliably lower than smartphone owners did (see Figure 
33), F(1, 130) = 4.32, p = .044, MSE = 291, η2p = .03. Finally, across electronic voting 
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systems, when overvotes in race 18 failed immediately via a pop-up warning and the 
review screen was a paginated series of screens subjects rated the electronic voting 
systems reliably lower (see Figure 34), F(2, 130) = 3.65, p = .032, MSE = 291, η2p = .05. 
 
 
!
Figure 32. Distribution of SUS ratings as a function of voting system. 
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Figure 33. Mean SUS rating across electronic voting systems as a function of smartphone 
ownership. 
 
Figure 34. Mean SUS rating across electronic voting systems as a function of race 18 fail method 
and review screen display method. !  
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DISCUSSION 
 Experiment two addressed limitations imposed in experiment one due to the 
artificial nature of the voting requirements and expanded the results to a more realistic 
voting environment and voting conditions. Chiefly, subjects, instead of being told who to 
vote for, were allowed to take the time to research the candidates and chose the ones they 
preferred to vote for. While this certainly complicated the analysis of errors it was 
necessary in order to be able to distinguish the differences in voting behavior and testing 
environments. In experiment one there were very strong effects of education such that 
lower educated voters tended to take much longer to complete their ballots and made 
more voting errors under a variety of conditions. In experiment two these effects failed to 
materialize. It is certainly possible that this reflects a difference in the testing scenarios. It 
may be the case that, despite the multiple avenues of instructional presentation, subjects 
with lower levels of education did not understand the testing procedures or less inclined 
to follow them. This has important implications for the testing the voting systems in 
general and testing labs should be aware that the artificiality of providing a slate of 
candidates for subjects to vote for might differentially affect subjects with lower levels of 
education. 
 Further, experiment two expanded upon the results of experiment one in a few 
important ways. The results from experiment two clearly demonstrate three important 
things. First, as discussed in experiment one, candidates positioned below the fold and 
out of initial view were particularly susceptible to being subject to voting errors. This has 
extremely important implications for candidates who do not align themselves with the 
major political parties, as on most ballots across the U.S. the major political parties are 
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the ones featured at the top of the race. These results suggest that candidates appearing 
below the fold when the number of candidates in the race is too many to be displayed on 
a single screen will be at a distinct disadvantage. 
Second, entirely consistent with and similar to the long-content races in 
experiment one, results from experiment two suggest that when the review screen is 
displayed as a single scrollable page voters are at an increased risk of committing voting 
errors. These results appear to suggest that the context in which the review screen is 
displayed (experiment two) may not be all that different then from the context in which 
long-content races are displayed throughout the ballot (experiment one) from the voters’ 
point of view. In experiment one when the long-content races were displayed as a single 
scrollable page, subjects were able to navigate away from these long-content races 
without being forced to view the additional candidates that fell below the fold.  
It was suggest then, that perhaps the increase in voting errors was due to some 
voters simply not recognizing there was content below the fold. In experiment two, 
however, when the review screen was displayed as a single scrollable page voters were 
required to scroll to the bottom of the list in order to complete and submit their ballots. 
Despite this requirement of the scrolling review screen, many fewer voting errors were 
observed when the review screen was paginated across several screens as opposed to 
being formatted as a single scrollable page. Further, results from experiment two show 
that the when review screen was displayed as a single scrollable page voters tended to 
complete their ballots faster than when the review screen was paginated across several 
screens. It is perhaps the case that, like in experiment one, voters are less inclined to take 
the time to review their votes as carefully when presented all at once in a single list as 
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opposed to being forced to page though multiple screens of choices. In retrospect it is 
easy to see how this might be the case.  
 Finally, older voters tended to complete their ballots slower than younger voters 
and across age groups both of the electronic voting systems were much slower than the 
paper ballot. In the case of the MVS any moderate increase in the time it takes to 
complete the ballot, regardless of age group, is likely to be simply inconsequential. Of the 
several potential benefits to a MVS, the ability and convenience of being able to vote 
remotely from a location of the voter’s choosing is among the top. It is highly likely that 
any moderate amount of time lost due to using a MVS, like the one described in 
experiments one and two, in a real election would be offset by not requiring voters to 
travel to a centralized polling place. In the case of the DRE and paper voting systems 
these results from experiment two serve to inform election officials and allow them better 
prepare polling locations in those areas where there are higher concentrations of older 
voters. 
 !  
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
DISCUSSION 
 The results from this research clearly demonstrate that candidates who are not 
immediately visible on the ballot (i.e., below the fold) are at a serious disadvantage when 
it comes to electronic voting systems. Results from experiment one and experiment two 
confirmed that these candidates have an increased risk of being mistakenly voted against, 
or even not voted for at all. This is in comparison to candidates who are immediately 
visible above the fold. This has carries with it serious implications for candidates who do 
not align themselves with one of the major political parties, as those candidates are the 
ones typically featured at or near the top of the ballot.  
While experiment one demonstrated this effect across both long-content races 
(i.e., the 1st and 18th races) experiment two confirmed this effect only in the 18th race. 
Nevertheless, this is an important result that has serious implications for the placement of 
candidates on a ballot. These results empirically demonstrate that candidates who are not 
immediately visible on the ballot are at a distinct disadvantage; providing strong support 
for the practice of candidate rotation— referring to the practice of alternating which 
candidates appear first in any given race on the ballot. 
To date, only eight U.S. states currently randomize ballots such that each 
candidate in a particular race appears at or near the top of the race between individual 
ballots (Winger, 2012). Candidate in the states of Alaska, California, Idaho, Kansas, 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio, appear an approximately equal 
number of times both above and below the fold across all ballots given out (Winger, 
2012). These states are thus likely not as subject to the effects of below the fold only 
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placement demonstrated in experiments one and two. Nevertheless, additional research 
could investigate this hypothesis and further determine the effects of alternate candidate 
placement schemes, such as the alphabetical listing of major political parties used in 
Colorado. 
 In addition to the results of individual candidate placement, the results of these 
two experiments also clearly demonstrate how long ballot content should be displayed on 
small-screened mobile devices. Experiment one demonstrated that paginating long ballot 
content across multiple screens produced fewer voting errors compared to when long 
ballot content was displayed as a single scrollable list. Experiment two also confirmed 
that paginated long ballot content was not only better for the actual candidate races, but 
for electronic review screens as well. This result persisted in experiment two despite the 
two different contexts between the two experiments. In experiment two the context 
shifted from selecting the correct choice (i.e., implementing voters’ intent in experiment 
one) to verifying the correct choice had indeed been made (i.e., verification).  
These results have important implications for the way in which long ballot content 
is displayed on smaller-screen devices and for the way in which any content that exceeds 
the size of the available electronic display should be formatted. These results indicate a 
point of speed-accuracy trade off. Results from both experiments one and two suggest 
that content that is too long to fit entirely on a single screen should be paginated when the 
context, as with voting, is such that the primary concern is effectiveness (i.e., the 
reduction of errors). This research has demonstrated that paginated content is less likely 
to produce errors than scrollable content. Conversely, in contexts in which the primary 
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concern is efficiency this research has demonstrated that scrollable content is more 
efficient than paginated content.  
A question that remains unanswered, based on this research, is how well the 
practice of paginating long content for use on small screen devices would scale to 
extreme cases in which the content is quite long. Consider the following example; on 
October 7, 2003, California held a specific kind of statewide special election known as a 
recall election. The intent of the election was for voters to determine if the then governor 
of California should (a) be removed from office and (b), if so, who should be the 
replacement governor. Given the rarity of the this type of election and the relatively low 
application requirements for appearing on the ballot—only 65 signatures plus $3500—a 
substantial number of candidates, 135 in total, appeared on the ballot for this one race 
(State of California, 2013).  
It is not immediately clear how well the results from experiments one and two 
would apply to an election of this magnitude. While in paginated mode, the MVS in this 
research displayed a maximum of six candidates per page. Using the 2003 California 
recall election as an example, the MVS used in this research would have utilized 23 pages 
to display the entire race—more pages than there were total candidate races on the ballot. 
Further, assuming that paginated content on a small screened device would continue to be 
more effective than scrolling that content in an election with 135 candidates in a single 
race, it would remain unclear how this situation might effect of the efficiency of MVS.  
Overall, experiments one and two showed that paginating long ballot content was 
slightly less efficient than scrolling long content. However, it would not be unreasonable 
to expect that the difference in efficiency between paginated long content and scrolled 
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long content would continue to grow as the content grew large. Additional research is 
needed to determine the exact relationship of the speed accuracy trade off between 
paginated and scrolled long content observed in this research when it applies to 
exceptionally large amounts of content. Doing so can help clarify conclusions made 
about where and when on the curve the efficiency of paginated content drops low enough 
to make scrolling content the better choice. 
It is also possible that gap in effectiveness between paginated and scrolling 
display methods might be narrowed by formatting the scrolling interface, especially for 
the MVS, in a style different than the formats used in experiments one and two. The 
scrollbars in on the MVS used in this research were standard display elements consistent 
with the scrollbars found throughout the Apple’s iOS operating system. The only 
exception to this was that the scrollbars were always visible in the MVS when long ballot 
content was displayed. In the current version of iOS the scrollbars fade and disappear 
when the display has not been scrolled up or down in a given amount of time.  
Incidentally, the miniaturization and fading out of view behavior of scrollbars 
found on small screen mobile devices is not unique to Apple’s iOS mobile operating 
system. Select versions of the Android mobile operating system also utilize this 
functionality. While one could argue that this type of interface design (the miniaturization 
and fading out of scrollbars) is a product of the greatly enhanced value that individual 
units of screen real estate have on small screen devices compared to displays with larger 
screen sizes, the research presented possibly speaks to the effect this design has on 
system effectiveness. If subjects were less likely to notice that content existed below the 
fold in the scrolling condition, as a result of the narrow and low-contrast scrollbar, this 
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would indicate a trade off point between the screen real estate needed for mechanical 
elements of the user interface and the screen real estate devoted to actual content. 
In this research, the scrollbars utilized for the MVS were left at the default 
settings and format found in the current version of Apple’s iOS. This decision was made 
in an effort to be as consistent with the surrounding operating system as possible and to 
enhance user familiarity effects. Further, by design, while the MVS in scrolling mode had 
room to display only the first six candidates (the rest required scrolling to view), the first 
quarter of the seventh candidate was also visible, presumably acting as another visual cue 
that there was content below the fold. 
One could argue, however, that the interfaces themselves, across voting systems, 
could have provided more salient clues that content existed below the fold. The data 
presented here is inconclusive as to whether or not subjects who made errors in the long-
content races were ever explicitly aware that scrolling was an option or that content even 
existed below the fold. For example, the scrollbars on the MVS could have been styled 
such that they were thicker, darker, or had higher contrast to the content that appeared 
above, below, behind and to the left side of the scrollbars. The interface on the MVS 
could have also included another visual indicator, such as an arrow or other symbol(s) 
that would have indicated content existed below the fold. While these design choices 
(i.e., stylized scrollbars and symbolic indicators of additional content) were considered in 
the initial design of the MVS, they were not included in the final design due to: (a) the 
space limitations inherent in the design of displays for small screen devices and (b) the 
fact that including these elements would necessarily preclude other features of the display 
(such as the partial display or the seventh race). 
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Further the scrolling condition could have utilized a forcing function to ensure 
that voters actually scrolled to the bottom of the races. While, this might have been 
accomplished via pinning the navigation buttons to the last candidate option in every race 
it would have violated a core usability principle of consistency in design. The navigation 
button in the current instantiation of the MVS adhere to this design principal via having 
the navigation buttons always visible and always in the footer of the interface where users 
would be mostly likely to notice them. An alternative solution may have been to 
introduce a pop-up warning to alert voters that they had not scrolled to the bottom on the 
race. Unfortunately, the data presented in this research does not speak to whether or not 
this would have caused more or less confusion with subjects nor the effects it might have 
on the effectiveness or efficiency of the MVS. 
Training may also be a means in which the effectiveness of a scrolling display 
method such as that used in the MVS might be improved. Subjects in experiments one 
and two, including the smartphone non-owners, were never explicitly trained on the 
voting task. One could imagine that a short training exercise built into the interface itself 
may have helped if in fact subjects were simply unaware that content existed below the 
fold in the scrolling condition and simply selected another candidate (as most of the error 
observed were wrong-choice voting errors). 
Finally, this research also clearly demonstrated that older voters compared to 
younger voters require more time to vote. In extreme cases, long lines at polling stations 
have the potential to disenfranchise voters by denying them the opportunity to cast a vote 
in a timely manner. This research showed that across all three voting systems and 
throughout experiments one and two, older voters tended to take longer to complete their 
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ballots. This carries serious implications for election administrators that oversee elections 
as a large percentage of the voting population are older adults. Though, the degree to 
which older voters tend to complete absentee ballots, where applicable, may somewhat 
mitigate this effect. Elections officials and voters alike in these jurisdictions would 
benefit from taking special precautions. Such precautions include: (a) providing 
additional early voting opportunities, (b) spreading out the number of people who show 
up at any one polling station across multiple days and additional voting equipment of 
various types. This would allow voters to use those technologies that they are most 
familiar with. 
 Despite the clear results regarding candidate placement and display methods, 
however, this work was largely inconclusive in regards to the effect that multi-vote races 
have on ballot effectiveness. It is possible that this is simply a confound in that the multi-
vote race deployed in experiment two was simultaneously one of the long-content races 
and was subject to the same above and below the fold voting effects seen in experiments 
one and two. Future researchers looking into this particular type of race may whish to de-
couple the long ballot content effects from the multi-vote race itself. 
This research was also not without a few limitations on its generalizability. The 
effects of subjects’ self-reported levels of education were not replicated in experiment 
two. It is possible that this represents an artifact of the testing environment. Though the 
underlying cause remains unclear, the laboratory setting coupled with a set of experiment 
instructions that involved directing subjects whom to vote for may have diminished the 
personal connection that voters develop when voting for a candidate of their choice. This 
effect, however, may differentially impact subjects with lower levels of education and 
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possibly explains the absence of these effects in experiment two in which subjects where 
allowed to research the candidates and decide for themselves who to vote for. 
Further, this research did not examine all the possible ways in which long ballot 
content might be displayed to voters nor did it attempt to quantify when or where voters 
might be most inclined to use a mobile voting system. In particular, future research into 
this area might consider examining the effects of candidate rotation and how this might 
mitigate the effects of displaying long ballot content in a scrollable fashion. It is possible, 
in jurisdictions in which candidate rotation is practiced, that the negative effects 
attributable to candidates appearing below the fold could be “washed out,” or at the very 
least be equally as bad for all candidates.  
Additionally, future research into this area may wish to consider examining when 
and where voters would actually use mobile technologies to cast their ballots. It is 
possible that these factors could heavily influence the effectiveness of any mobile voting 
system. Voters who would choose to vote from their place of business, for example, may 
have additional cognitive load or unnecessary distractions, that may lead to decreased 
voting system effectiveness and efficiency. Effects of this nature would likely be very 
difficult to properly measure in a laboratory setting and may simply not be present in 
polling stations in which the only focus, or goal, is to complete the ballot. 
 !  
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, this research has led to a better understanding of how voting systems, 
especially the electronic variants, should support voters. When ballot content is too long 
to be displayed in its entirety then that content should be paginated across multiple 
screens, at the expense of efficiency and the extent to which it scales to heavily contested 
races, to reduce voting errors. Similarly, this research provides strong support for the 
practice of candidate rotation to help ensure that candidates that fall below the fold 
appear above the fold an equally as often. To help ensure accurate election tallies that 
reflect the will of the electorate, ballot designs should consider these design requirements 
when formatting ballots.  
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APPENDIX B
President And Vice President:
Althea Weibein (I)
United States Senator:
Fern Brzezinski (D)
Representative in Congress:
Robert Mettler (D)
Governor:
Rick Stickles (D)
Lieutenant Governor:
Cassie Principe (D)
Attorney General:
Rick Organ (D)
Comptroller of Public Accounts:
Greg Converse (D)
Commissioner of General Land 
Office:
Sam Saddler (R)
Commissioner of Agriculture:
Roberto Aron (D)
Railroad Commissioner:
Zachary Minick (D)
State Senator:
Wesley Steven Millette (D)
State Representative District 134:
Susanne Rael (D)
Member State Board of Education
District 2:
Mark Baber (D)
Presiding Judge Texas Supreme 
Court Place 3:
Tim Grasty (D)
Presiding Judge Court of Criminal 
Appeals Place 2:
Derrick Melgar (D)
District Attorney:
Jennifer A. Lundeed (D)
County Treasurer:
Gordon Kallas (D)
Houston I.S.D. Trustee, District 4
Tia Menges (D)
Sheriff:
Stanley Saari (R)
County Tax Assessor:
Randy H. Clemons
Justice of the Peace:
Deborah Kamps
Proposition 1:
No
Proposition 2:
Yes!
Proposition 3:
Yes
Proposition 4:
No!
Proposition 5:
Yes
Proposition 6:
Yes
Please vote for the following candidates and propositions on all three ballots.
ADPB
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President And Vice President:
Gordon Bearce (R)
United States Senator:
Cecile Cadieux (R)
Representative in Congress:
Robert Mettler (D)
Governor:
Glen Travis Lozier (R)
Lieutenant Governor:
Shane Terrio (R)
Attorney General:
Tim Speight (R)
Comptroller of Public Accounts:
Greg Converse (D)
Commissioner of General Land 
Office:
Sam Saddler (R)
Commissioner of Agriculture:
Polly Rylander (R)
Railroad Commissioner:
Jillian Balas (R)
State Senator:
Ricardo Nigro (R)
State Representative District 134:
Petra Bencomo (R)
Member State Board of Education
District 2:
Peter Varga (R)
Presiding Judge Texas Supreme 
Court Place 3:
Tim Grasty (D)
Presiding Judge Court of Criminal 
Appeals Place 2:
Dan Plouffee (R)
District Attorney:
Corey Behnke (R)
County Treasurer:
Dean Caffee (R)
Houston I.S.D. Trustee, District 4
Allan Trabert (R)
Sheriff:
Stanley Saari (R)
County Tax Assessor:
Howard Grady
Justice of the Peace:
Deborah Kamps
Proposition 1:
No
Proposition 2:
Yes
Proposition 3:
No
Proposition 4:
Yes
Proposition 5:
Yes
Proposition 6:
No
Please vote for the following candidates and propositions on all three ballots.
ARPT
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APPENDIX C
VOTE BOTH SIDES OF BALLOT
COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
(Vote for One)
•  Corey Behnke REP
•  Jennifer A. Lundeed DEM
COUNTY TREASURER
(Vote for One)
•  Dean Caffee REP
•  Gordon Kallas DEM
HOUSTON I.S.D.
 TRUSTEE, DISTRICT 4
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Atchley REP
•  Lewis Shine REP
•  Jessie Emmer REP
•  Christian Liberatore REP
•  Allan Trabert REP
•  Dona Vasta DEM
•  Odessa Rugh DEM
•  Tia Menges DEM
•  Katherine Ramos IND
•  Tanisha Guarnieri IND
•  Amie Vecchio IND
•  Thomas McKendree IND
•  Ericka Hinze IND
•  Jessie Smith IND
•  Samantha Foos IND
SHERIFF
(Vote for One)
•  Stanley Saari REP
•  Jason Valle DEM
COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR
(Vote for One)
•  Howard Grady
•  Randy H. Clemons
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
(Vote for One)
•  Deborah Kamps
•  Clyde Gayton Jr.
GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
NOVEMBER 4, 2012
• TO VOTE, COMPLETELY FILL IN THE OVAL < >  NEXT TO YOUR CHOICE.
• Use only the marking device provided or a number 2 pencil.
• If you make a mistake, do not hesitate to ask for a new ballot. If you erase or make other marks, 
your vote may not count.
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
(Vote for One)
•  Gordon Bearce
     with Nathan Maclean REP
•  Vernon Stanley Albury
     with Richard Rigby DEM
•  Janette Froman
     with Chris Aponte LIB
•  Jamie Bohnert
     with Nelson Bashore CON
•  Ted Thelan
     with Neil Canady SOC
•  Donald Creviston
     with Darren Manwaring IND
•  Darren Cort
     with Jim Leber IND
•  Althea Weibein
     with Guy Klump IND
•  Fernando Terhaar
     with Allan Rakowski IND
•  Kurt Haislip
     with Margery Bartol IND
CONGRESSIONAL
UNITED STATES SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Cecile Cadieux REP
•  Fern Brzezinski DEM
•  Corey Dery IND
REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS
(Vote for One)
•  Pedro Brouse REP
•  Robert Mettler DEM
STATE
GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Glen Travis Lozier REP
•  Rick Stickles DEM
•  Maurice Humble IND
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Shane Terrio REP
•  Cassie Principe DEM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Speight REP
•  Rick Organ DEM
STATE (Continued)
COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTS
(Vote for One)
•  Therese Gustin IND
•  Greg Converse DEM
COMMISSIONER OF GENERAL 
LAND OFFICE
(Vote for One)
•  Sam Saddler REP
•  Elise Ellzey DEM
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE
(Vote for One)
•  Polly Rylander REP
•  Roberto Aron DEM
RAILROAD COMMISSIONER
(Vote for One)
•  Jillian Balas REP
•  Zachary Minick DEM
STATE SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Ricardo Nigro REP
•  Wesley Steven Millette DEM
STATE REPRESENTATIVE
DISTRICT 134
(Vote for One)
•  Petra Bencomo REP
•  Susanne Rael DEM
MEMBER 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT 2
(Vote for One)
•  Peter Varga REP
•  Mark Baber DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT
PLACE 3
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Grasty DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, 
PLACE 2
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Plouffe REP
•  Derrick Melgar DEM
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VOTE BOTH SIDES OF BALLOT
COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
(Vote for One)
•  Corey Behnke REP
•  Jennifer A. Lundeed DEM
COUNTY TREASURER
(Vote for One)
•  Dean Caffee REP
•  Gordon Kallas DEM
HOUSTON I.S.D.
 TRUSTEE, DISTRICT 4
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Atchley REP
•  Lewis Shine REP
•  Jessie Emmer REP
•  Christian Liberatore REP
•  Allan Trabert REP
•  Dona Vasta DEM
•  Odessa Rugh DEM
•  Tia Menges DEM
•  Katherine Ramos IND
•  Tanisha Guarnieri IND
•  Amie Vecchio IND
•  Thomas McKendree IND
•  Ericka Hinze IND
•  Jessie Smith IND
•  Samantha Foos IND
SHERIFF
(Vote for One)
•  Stanley Saari REP
•  Jason Valle DEM
COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR
(Vote for One)
•  Howard Grady
•  Randy H. Clemons
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
(Vote for One)
•  Deborah Kamps
•  Clyde Gayton Jr.
GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
NOVEMBER 4, 2012
• TO VOTE, COMPLETELY FILL IN THE OVAL < >  NEXT TO YOUR CHOICE.
• Use only the marking device provided or a number 2 pencil.
• If you make a mistake, do not hesitate to ask for a new ballot. If you erase or make other marks, 
your vote may not count.
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
(Vote for One)
•  Gordon Bearce
     with Nathan Maclean REP
•  Vernon Stanley Albury
     with Richard Rigby DEM
•  Janette Froman
     with Chris Aponte LIB
•  Jamie Bohnert
     with Nelson Bashore CON
•  Ted Thelan
     with Neil Canady SOC
•  Donald Creviston
     with Darren Manwaring IND
•  Darren Cort
     with Jim Leber IND
•  Althea Weibein
     with Guy Klump IND
•  Fernando Terhaar
     with Allan Rakowski IND
•  Kurt Haislip
     with Margery Bartol IND
CONGRESSIONAL
UNITED STATES SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Cecile Cadieux REP
•  Fern Brzezinski DEM
•  Corey Dery IND
REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS
(Vote for One)
•  Pedro Brouse REP
•  Robert Mettler DEM
STATE
GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Glen Travis Lozier REP
•  Rick Stickles DEM
•  Maurice Humble IND
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
(Vote for One)
•  Shane Terrio REP
•  Cassie Principe DEM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Speight REP
•  Rick Organ DEM
STATE (Continued)
COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTS
(Vote for One)
•  Therese Gustin IND
•  Greg Converse DEM
COMMISSIONER OF GENERAL 
LAND OFFICE
(Vote for One)
•  Sam Saddler REP
•  Elise Ellzey DEM
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE
(Vote for One)
•  Polly Rylander REP
•  Roberto Aron DEM
RAILROAD COMMISSIONER
(Vote for One)
•  Jillian Balas REP
•  Zachary Minick DEM
STATE SENATOR
(Vote for One)
•  Ricardo Nigro REP
•  Wesley Steven Millette DEM
STATE REPRESENTATIVE
DISTRICT 134
(Vote for One)
•  Petra Bencomo REP
•  Susanne Rael DEM
MEMBER 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT 2
(Vote for One)
•  Peter Varga REP
•  Mark Baber DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT
PLACE 3
(Vote for One)
•  Tim Grasty DEM
PRESIDING JUDGE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, 
PLACE 2
(Vote for One)
•  Dan Plouffe REP
•  Derrick Melgar DEM
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